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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 10, 1954

SUBJECT: The Guatemalan Problem

PARTICIPANTS: Anibal Jara, Chilean Ambassador
Horacio Suarez, Minister-Counselor, Chilean Embassy
ARA - Mr. Holland
OSA - Mr. Barall

COPIES TO: Amembassy SANTIAGO
MID - Mr. Burrows; Mr. Leddy
AR - Amb. Dreier; Mr. Jamison; Mr. Sanders
ARA/P - Mr. Wieland; Mr. Herron
Amembassy GUATEMALA
ARA (2) - Mr. Woodward; Mr. Pearson; Amb. Pawley

The Ambassador called on Mr. Holland to inform him, upon instructions from his government, that Chile will attend the OAS meeting dealing with the Guatemalan problem. He made it clear, however, that his government was not committed to any specific course of action with respect to any resolution which might be passed. The Ambassador explained the apprehensions of his government that the meeting may tend to be divisive and so do great damage to hemispheric solidarity. He assumed that there would be broad and bitter discussion among the participating countries, which would make up their minds during the course of the meeting. He assumed that Guatemala would attend and would certainly defend itself. Under these conditions he emphasized that the US should have facts to present. By way of background for Chile, he mentioned the 35-10 vote in favor of Guatemala in the Chamber of Deputies and the speeches made in the Senate by left-wing [illegible]ators. However, he said this could not be interpreted as Chile's r[illegible] because it is the Executive group which must make the decision.

Mr. Holland said he was glad the Ambassador had cc[illegible] h[illegible] wished to give him a copy of the resolution which had [illegible] mbassador Beaulac for transmittal to the Foreign Office and the [illegible]r. Holland said he would appreciate receiving the Ambassador's obs[illegible]fter he had had an opportunity to study the resolution. He sai[illegible] a miracle that the secrecy of the resolution had been preserved and that no inkling of its contents had appeared in the press. He expressed the hope that its se[illegible] would continue to be safeguarded.

Referring to Ambassador Jara's statements, Mr. Holland explained that this res[illegible]on was very important because the future and the validity of the OAS would be tested at the meeting on Guatemala, if such a meeting was held. Mr. Holland said it would be most important to avoid (a) the failure to pass a resolution and (b) the passage of a resolution which would be just words. For this reason the US had distributed the resolution with the hope that

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definite action and a successful outcome for the meeting could be assured in advance. He said that with copies having been distributed to 18 countries, it was obvious that we could not discuss many broad changes with each of them. The US had tried to anticipate the feelings of the other countries in the drafting of the resolution.

The Ambassador again commented on his apprehensions and those of his government, indicating that he was not sure of his government's ultimate position and that adverse political repercussions were anticipated in Chile. Mr. Holland made the point that President Ibañez, more than any other President in the hemisphere, had demonstrated his anti-communist position. Mr. Holland made it clear that the action under consideration was directed only against the communists in Guatemala and that the US did not wish to take any action which would hurt our "brother people" in Guatemala.

ARA:OSA:MBarall:av